Enhancing Architectural Mismatch Detection with Assumptions by Uchitel, S & Yankelevich, D
Enhancing Architectural Mismatch
Detection with Assumptions 
Sebastia´n Uchitel, Daniel Yankelevich
Dpto. de Computacio´n, Universidad de Buenos Aires
fsuchitel,danyg@dc.uba.ar
Abstract
Detecting software architecture inconsistencies is a criti-
cal issue in software design. Software systems are described
in terms of components, component behavior and interac-
tion and mismatch detection is explored through techniques
based on behavior analysis. Integration problems, how-
ever, are not only caused by behavioral mismatch: compo-
nents make assumptions about their environment to guaran-
tee functional and non-functional properties. If the actual
deployment environment of each component does not satisfy
its assumptions, component and system properties may not
hold. In this work we propose to extend the idea of archi-
tectural mismatch to include the notion of assumption. We
concentrate on a subset of possible assumptions and show
how software architects can benefit from using them. We
also present a discussion on how architecture description
languages (ADLs) can be extended to include assumptions.
1. Introduction
Detecting software architecture inconsistencies, such as
incompatible components, is a critical issue in software
design, and there has been significant work in the Soft-
ware Architecture (SA) community in this direction. Soft-
ware systems are described in terms of components, compo-
nent behavior and interaction [20] and mismatch detection
is explored through techniques based on behavior analysis
[16, 8, 2]. Connectors and connections have a vital role in
mismatch detection because they model how components
are being combined in a software system. Issues as if con-
nectors should be explicitly represented in architectures or
not, whether they are first class entities [2] or what infor-
mation should they convey [20] have been discussed exten-
sively. However, in these discussions, it is assumed that
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connections are control transfer points, parameter passing
or shared data [20]. As Parnas pointed out in 1972, such a
definition of connection is a highly dangerous oversimplifi-
cation (sic). The connections between components are the
assumptions which the components make about each other
[18].
Many examples can be given to show that component
assumptions can be critical at an architectural level analysis.
For example,
 Transaction servers or security supervisors usually as-
sume that all accesses to a database server are done
through them. It is not enough to check if compo-
nents that interact with them follow the expected com-
munication protocol, because the violation of their as-
sumptions may make their functionality useless. For
instance bypassing a transaction server may prevent it
from providing consistent transactions or 100% recov-
ery on failures.
 X-Windows components make important assumptions
on the number and distribution of simultaneously ac-
tive windows and although too many active windows
do not cause a change in how X-Windows services are
required (e.i. interaction is not affected), performance
may drop to an unacceptable level. As presented in
[10] the idea of implementing a spreadsheet using an
X-Windows component by implementing each cell as
a window is sound in terms of interfaces and interac-
tion mechanisms, however taking into account the as-
sumptions of an X-Window component, the approach
makes no sense.
 Real time components make many assumptions on the
network reliability and latency and can only guarantee
some properties if these assumptions are kept.
 Coordinating agents make assumptions on version
numbers in mobile systems in order to guarantee qual-
ity of certain distributed services.
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The point is that all these properties, secure transactions,
reasonable performance, compliance to real time deadlines
and quality of service, are granted because they have been
proved or tested up to certain hypothesis. Therefore, these
hypothesis or in other words assumptions, are important and
must be kept.
In this paper we propose to extend the idea of architec-
tural mismatch. We show that it is important to analyze not
only if components interact together correctly but also if all
component assumptions are not violated by their environ-
ments. We concentrate on a specific subset of possible as-
sumptions and show in Section 3 by means of two examples
how software architects can benefit from using assumptions
to enhance architectural descriptions and detect mismatches
that would go undetected if only interaction information is
used. In Section 4 instead of proposing yet another architec-
ture description language (ADL), we discuss how existing
ADLs can be extended to include the ideas presented in this
paper. Finally in 5 with conclusions and future work.
2. Related work
The term assumption has been used by the software en-
gineering community in different ways. Our perspective
of this term is borrowed from [18] where connections are
thought of as assumptions that components make about
each other, instead of control or information transfer points.
Our view is that assumptions extend the idea of connection
as a control or information transfer point, that interaction
and assumptions can be combined to enhance architectural
mismatch detection.
The idea of using assumptions as behavior abstractions
can be found in work by Allen [1] on the architecture de-
scription language (ADL) Wright [20]. In Wright compo-
nents interact with their environment through ports that re-
late to roles, which are connector interaction points. The
architect defines the component, connector, port and role se-
mantics using a subset of the language CSP [7] taking into
account that a specification is consistent only if the port/role
specification is an abstraction of the components/connectors
behavior. Although ports and roles were introduced to sup-
port connector reuse, ports and roles can be seen as the in-
teraction a component or connector assumes there will be
through that particular port or role. Once connector-role and
component-port consistency has been checked, some inter-
action mismatches can be detected analyzing abstracted be-
havior only. This approach differs from our work, from our
perspective component assumptions are not abstractions of
their own behavior, abstractions add information to behav-
ioral specification. In Section 4 we exemplify the prob-
lems that arise trying to force our view of assumptions in
a Wright setting.
Other ADLs [19, 17, 5, 14, 21, 15] are also oriented
towards describing the notion of information exchange of
control flow through connectors and do not approach the
idea of component assumptions. In Section 4 we discuss
the relation between existing ADLs and assumptions more
extensively.
Cheung and Kramer [12] mention how assumptions can
be introduced into hierarchical composition of components
by means of user-specified interfaces. Although interfaces
are not limited to interaction through one specific port as
in the Wright approach, they still are tied to the concept
of architectural behavior: User-specified interfaces can be
included at a certain level of the composition hierarchy as
long as they include all possible behaviors of their peers.
Assumptions are not general system properties as their ap-
proach suggests, assumptions are an important part of a
component description therefore from a hierarchical point
of view the behavior and assumptions of a component
should be on the same level. This would not be possible
with the user-specified interface approach as the assump-
tions of a component need not be an abstraction of the com-
ponent behavior.
The term assumption is used differently in [9]. The main
idea is to use assumptions to verify specific properties such
as deadlock freedom in a tractable manner. Assumptions are
derived from actual behaviors taking into account the prop-
erty to be proved, and then checked without constructing
the complete system model. Although the general idea of
assumptions is the same, in this approach assumptions are
given explicitly by users to guarantee a set of ad hoc proper-
ties while in [9] assumptions are generated from behaviors
using the knowledge of the property to be verified.
The object orientated community has been working for
some time on design patterns [4]. Design patterns describe
interaction mechanisms for solving specific problems. Each
problem can be considered a description of the environment
for which the pattern is suitable. These restrictions on the
environment of the pattern resemble our idea of assump-
tions but applied to a set of components with a specific in-
teraction mechanism.
Within the MetaObject Protocol (MOP) community, the
context in which a software component will be used is given
a fundamental role [11]. The main idea is that a component
is designed and implemented with certain assumptions over
its context and intended use. Many times these do not match
the clients intended use, therefor, the MOP community pro-
poses that objects should provide ways for their clients to
modify their behaviors to better suit their needs. The bot-
tom line is that context and intended use (e.i. assumptions
on components environment) are important for system con-
struction. In a way, the MOP approach can be seen as the
dual of ours: they are interested in implementations that
allow modifying component assumptions while we are in-
terested in describing assumptions relevant to software ar-
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chitecture.
3. Examples
To motivate discussion, we present two examples, a truck
tracking system and a gas station system. We will use in
this section two types of diagrams. For representing the
behavior of components in terms of their interaction we
will use labeled transition systems where states represent
component states, arcs represent potential state changes of
a component and arc labels for the actions that a compo-
nent must perform when changing state. For representing
a system architecture we will use a hierachy of subsytems
as in [13]. Subsystems, represented as boxes with rounded
corners, are formed by the parallel composition of their de-
scendants, which can be subsystems or simply components
(represented with rectangles). For a formal definition of la-
beled transition systems and parallel composition refer to
Appendix A.
3.1. A truck tracking system example
A freight transportation and logistics company needs a
system that can keep track of its truck fleet, reporting on
positions of individual trucks and general statistics. The ap-
proach it takes in the construction of such a system is a com-
mercial off-the-shelf (COTS) one. The company decides to
buy a geographical information server that is capable of re-
ceiving information from remote mobile entities, process it
and respond to queries (e.i. truck nearest to an unscheduled
delivery point). In addition a control component is to be de-
veloped for administration purposes and to process certain
data according to particular company requirements.
The server controls the status of a truck distribution fleet
by providing a service named Register. Trucks Register pe-
riodically to the server and receive an acknowledge each
time. One of the tracking service provided by the server
allows clients to receive a stream of Positions (in terms of
street names), a client issues Start and Stop commands to
access this service. In addition, this server, as many servers
do, requires maintenance. Periodically, a maintenance ser-
vice Purge must be launched so all old Register data can
be deleted. If the server is not Purged often enough, per-
formance, and therefore accuracy, of the Positions stream
degrades quickly. Once the server performs the administra-
tion tasks launched by Purge it returns a status report Done.
There are many reasons a server of these characteristics may
not include automatic administration features, for example,
the resource usage of administration tasks may lower per-
formance temporarily, thus the decision of when to launch
them could be done more effectively by a user. Figure 1
describes the behavior of the server in terms of three pro-
cesses, one for each service provided by the server. These
processes are composed to describe the overall server be-
havior. In Figure 2 we show the complete server behavior
as the composition of its three service processes.
0 1
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Start
1
Service 3
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Figure 1. Behavior of the server processes
Service 1 Service 2 Service 3
Server
Figure 2. Behavior of the server component
It is clear that our model of the server is so far incom-
plete. If this model were the only information provided by
the COTS manufacturer, it would be insufficient for assem-
bling properly a system based on the server component. The
reason is that there is a strong requirement for user interven-
tion for maintenance purposes. This requirement clearly is
not an interaction issue as it does not impose a strict behav-
ior of server environment, rather, it expresses an assumption
that the server makes over its environment on how it should
be used. If the environment does not fulfill this assumption,
the server will eventually degrade. How can this additional
information be included in the system model? The manu-
facturer of the server ought to be able to guarantee a certain
level of efficiency based on the amount of register informa-
tion the server processes, therefore an assumption that the
server will be purged before a certain number of Register
events can be easily modeled by an LTS. Figure 3 models
this assumption choosing (arbitrarily) five as the amount of
Register events for which performance of the server cannot
be guaranteed. Note that state 5 is a trap o error state that
models the fact that the assumption has not been complied
to. In Figure 4 we describe the complete description of the
Server component as a composition of its behavior (boxes
with solid lines) and assumptions (boxes with dashed lines).
Suppose a Control component was built implementing
the company’s business rules but not taking into account
server assumptions (Figure 5). The final system model (Fig-
ure 6) including trucks and server and control components
should provide the necesary information to detect a mis-
match between how the server is used and how the server
Authorized licensed use limited to: Imperial College London. Downloaded on June 23,2010 at 15:09:53 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
1 2 3 4 5Register0
Purge
Assumption
Register Register
Purge
Register
Purge
Register
Purge
Figure 3. Assumptions of the Server compo-
nent
Service 1 Service 2 Service 3
Server
Assumption
Figure 4. Complete server description includ-
ing behavior and assumptions
was expected to be used. In this case, as server assumptions
were explicitly included in the model, any deadlock detec-
tion method or reachability analysis (for example [3, 13])
can reveal the mismatch: the system can evolve into state 5
of the server assumption therefore the server assumptions
do not hold meaning that system performance cannot be
guaranteed.
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i
Figure 5. Behaviors of the control and truck
component
TruckControl Server
Service 1 Service 2 Service 3
System
Assumption
Figure 6. Truck tracking system
A solution to this problem (taking into account that the
COTS server is not modifiable) is building a wrapper around
the server that automates all maintenance operations hiding
the original server from components while preserving its
services. It has a very simple structure with one process for
truck registering and another for performing maintenance
operations when needed (Figures 7 and 8).
By applying simple changes to other components (Fig-
i
i
i
i
i i
2
0 1
3
Register
Ack
WRegister
WAck
Wrapper 1
0
Register 1 Register 2
0
Purge
Wrapper 2
Purge WPurge
WPurge
Figure 7. Behavior of the wrapper processes
Wrapper
Server Wrapper 1 Wrapper 2
AssumptionService 3Service 2Service 1
Figure 8. Wrapper component
ure 9) a new system (Figure 10) may be constructed that
guarantees assumptions made by the Server component.
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Figure 9. Behaviors of modified control and
truck components
System
WrapperControl
Server Wrapper 1 Wrapper 2
AssumptionService 3Service 2Service 1
Truck
Figure 10. Truck tracking system with as-
sumptions
The issue here is that a although the initial system con-
figuration was correct in terms of component interaction, a
mismatch was occurring between the intended use of a com-
ponent and the actual use it was given by its environment.
Failure in satisfying the component assumption means that
the component cannot guarantee a certain level of perfor-
mance, therefore the consequence of not using explicit as-
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sumption would have been not detecting in advance a un-
satisfactory system configuration. In the next example we
show how assumptions can be used to guarantee correct
functional use of a component based on a well-known ex-
ample.
3.2. A gas station example
We present another example based on a case presented
originally by [6] and further studied by [12]. A gas station
is modeled by an operator, two customers, a pump and a
customer request queue. Figures 12 and 11 show the LTS
for the behaviors of all components. The operator accepts
money from clients (Prepayi) and according to the request
queue activates (Activatei) the pump. Once the operator
receives the charge information (Chargei) from the pump
the change (Changei) is given to the customer and the re-
quest queue is updated. The pump must be activated be-
fore receiving commands for starting and stopping to pump
gas (Starti, Finishi) and finally informing the amount to be
charged.
Charge1,
Charge2
23
0 1
Change1,
Change2C_None
C_Wait
Prepay1,
Prepay2
P_Occupied
4
Activate
P_Avail
Operator
2
Queue
0 i
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C_None
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Figure 11. Behavior of the operator and the
queue components
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23
0 1
Cust2
Prepay2
Change2 Start2
Finish2
Figure 12. Behavior of the pump and cus-
tomer components
The complete system behavior (Figure 13) has a prob-
lem [12]: The operator may receive charge information of
Customer
1
from the pump and use for giving change to
Customer
2
. The origin of this malfunction is in the interac-
tion between the operator and the pump. However, there is
no interaction mismatch, components coordinate correctly
and the system does not deadlock. The problem is that the
operator is not working correctly in terms of the assump-
tions that the pump has. The pump can serve one customer
at a time, before serving a customer it requires to be acti-
vated. Although the pump behavior does not restrict Start,
Finish and Charge commands to be of the same customer
after activation, it assumes that it will be. As these assump-
tions have not been explicitly stated in the system model of
Figure 13 the fact that an important system property does
not hold may not be detected.
Pump
Station
Operator Queue
Counter
Gas Station
Cust1 Cust2
Clients
Figure 13. Gas station system
The assumptions the pump makes on how customers are
to be managed can be modeled as the composition of two in-
dividual assumptions (Figure 14). The first one models the
pumps assumption that customers are charged immediately
after they have finished pumping gas, the second models
the supposition that customers do not use a different cus-
tomer number for starting and stopping the pump. If these
assumptions are kept, problems such as correct change [12]
would not arise. Expliciting these assumptions as in Figure
15 allows for mismatch detection using standard techniques
([3, 13]). Analysis reveals that the new system model can
reach state 4 of the first pump assumption, thus the pump
has not been included in an adequate environment and cor-
rect system behavior cannot be guaranteed.
0 1 2 0
Assumption 2
12
Start2
Stop2
Assumption 1
Start1
Stop1
Finish1
Charge1
Finish2
Charge2
Figure 14. Assumptions of the pump compo-
nent
4. Assumptions in architecture description lan-
guages
In previous sections, we have shown why component be-
havior is not the only cause for architectural mismatch and
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Figure 15. Complete gas station description
therefore can provide important information at the architec-
tural design stage. We now discuss some issues on how
component assumptions may be included in current archi-
tecture description languages (ADLs).
The first point is if component assumptions are already
expressible in current ADLs. A first thought might be the
following. Assumptions seem to predicate over interac-
tion and ADLs already model component interaction, aren’t
assumptions the same thing as the behavioral descriptions
found in ADLs? No, for several reasons:
 Component behavior is implemented in terms of ports,
function calls, service points, and protocols in real pro-
gramming languages. Oppositely, assumptions are not
explicitly written into component code, they are com-
ponent requirements, therefore they are validated and
verified, not implemented.
 A component assumption predicates on its environ-
ment behavior, not on its own behavior. Compo-
nent behavior predicates about interaction between the
component and “neighboring” components while com-
ponent assumptions may be made on components that
do not interact directly with itself. The alphabet for
describing behavior is different from the one for as-
sumptions.
 Behavioral descriptions model the capabilities of a
component. In order to use the component, the en-
vironment must interact through the modeled interac-
tion point following the defined protocols. Assump-
tions can be, in some sense, not so strong depending
on the property they guarantee. The architect could
decide explicitly not to satisfy an assumption and this
decision may not invalid the use of the component. In
our example, if users do not maintain the server as as-
sumed, the server might not stop working, but perfor-
mance could drop dramatically. This could even be
irrelevant to a user not concerned about performance
issues.
In architecture description languages concepts such as
connectors (Wright [20], Unicon [19], C2 [17], Aesop [5]),
connections (Rapide [14], MetaH [21]) or bindings (Dar-
win [15]) are used to represent interaction between com-
ponents: high level protocols, interaction points, ports, etc.
These concepts are based on the notion of information ex-
change and interaction, thus architecture description lan-
guages presently cannot express assumptions. In partic-
ular cases, connectors can technically be used to express
some assumptions that a component does. But this is nei-
ther the goal nor the idea of connectors. To illustrate this
point we will comment why Wright cannot be used for ex-
pressing assumptions. We choose because it is a well known
ADL that captures many of the concepts in the software ar-
chitecture field, however our discussion could be based on
some of the other ADLs. In our example server assump-
tions describe the expected environment behavior in terms
of three different interaction points. If one were to model
these assumptions in Wright, it would be necessary to use a
port specification. However as our assumption refers to all
three server services, all services would need to be provided
through the same port. Although this restriction on the way
services must be modeled is rather unintuitive, Wright also
requires port specifications to be an abstraction of the com-
ponent behavior. So it would also be necessary to include
the components assumption in the components behavior de-
scription. Thus both behavior and assumptions would be
mixed which is not what we want. We would end up with
a complicated behavior description, in which different ar-
chitectural aspects are mixed up. In particular, the Wright
specification would be expressing that the server requires
a certain interaction pattern in order to interact correctly,
while the assumption intended to be a requirement needed
to assure performance aspects.
How can assumptions be included in a SA description?
The starting point is that as behavior and assumptions refer
to different problems it is natural for the architect to provide
them separately when modeling a component. Two main
aspects need to be defined, how to model assumptions and
how to combine behavior and assumption descriptions.
As there are many kinds of assumptions that a compo-
nent modeling them can be a difficult task. Component as-
sumptions can range from non-functional properties such
as network latency to component version numbers. Even
considering assumptions on interaction, which is on what
ADLs focus on, there are many possibilities. A compo-
nent might expect a certain usage pattern of its services as
we have seen in section 3.1. These patterns could involve
time constraints such as when a database server might have
been designed to support up to a certain amount of register
updates per minute. A component might even assume the
probability of a service being used. The picture gets more
complicated as assumptions are not necessarily limited to
the components interactions with its environment, assump-
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tions on intra-environment interaction can occur too: Take
an agent coordinating the work of several components, it
might make assumptions on the kind and moment of inter-
actions that occur between components being coordinated.
Although the spectrum of assumptions is too big to man-
age in one formalism, ADLs can be extended to model
some assumptions. ADLs model component interaction
and system structure, therefore it is reasonable to extend
them to express assumptions on the interaction capabilities
of the environment. The following are some guidelines that
should be used:
 ADLs model component behavior in an operational
manner, thus a feasible and simple approach would be
give assumptions in a similar manner.
 Probably the same kind of formalism could be used to
describe behavior and assumptions. In our examples
labeled transition systems were used, however other
formalisms such as process algebra (as in Wright)
could be used.
 Assumption specification must be independent from
component behavioral description as they represent
different ideas, component assumptions are not imple-
mented, behavior is.
 Component interface should remain untouched by as-
sumptions.
 Components are, at an architectural level, the basic
construction unit, therefore their complete specifica-
tion (behavior and assumptions) should be regarded
as unit too in the overall system model. Components
modeled together with their assumptions must be com-
posable in the same way components are combined in
ADLs presently.
 Component assumptions are not implemented thus
assumptions communicating or interacting make no
sense: Assumptions must not add component or sys-
tem behaviors. In other words combining components
behavior with its assumptions must, at most, restrict
the overall component behavior.
 Mismatch detection can be done by making assump-
tion specifications listen or monitor architecture inter-
action and keep track of the properties they express.
In this way standard reachability techiniques and tools
could be used.
5. Conclusions and future work
In this work we have proposed applying a broader no-
tion of connection to software architectures. The connec-
tions between components also include the assumptions that
the components make about each other. We have shown
through some simple examples that explicitly specifying
component assumptions is important, it can help detect soft-
ware architecture mismatches that otherwise go unnoticed.
We have shown that existing ADLs cannot, as they are now,
express assumptions and finally instead of present yet an-
other ADL we show how existing ones can be easily ex-
tended to include some kinds of assumptions.
The contribution of this work from the software engi-
neering perspective is that using assumptions in an archi-
tectural description allows expressing requirements that are
not in the scope of behavioral descriptions. Even for re-
quirements that relate closely to behavioral description of
a component, assumptions provide conceptual clarity, sep-
arating concerns and not interfering with components inter-
face.
This work represents only a first step in adding assump-
tions to software architecture descriptions. An interesting
aspect to work on is to understand what kinds of assump-
tions are relevant at a software architecture level descrip-
tion, for example assumptions on structure, on regularity,
distribution, bursts of service calls, assumptions on data,
etc. A second aspect is how to include these other kinds of
assumptions in existing ADLs and lastly modify or create
new ADLs that can manage assumptions. Finally, the rela-
tion between assumptions and non-functional properties, as
shown in our example, should be further analyzed.
A. Labeled Transition Systems
We model process behavior by labeled transition systems
(LTS). An LTS of a process contains the set of states that
the process can reach and a set of labeled transitions be-
tween states that model all possible evolutions of the pro-
cess state. Transition labels are the actions performed by
a process that are relevant for a particular behavioral de-
scription. The internal actions of a process that determine
state changes are represented by transitions labeled with the
symbol  . The set of non internal actions of a process P is
called alphabet and noted (P). Formally an LTS of a com-
ponent is a quadruple (S; A; Æ; s) where S is a set of states,
A = (P) [ fg is a set of labels, Æ  S  A  S is a
transition relation and s 2 S is the initial state.
An LTS of a process P = (S; A; Æ; s) can evolve into an
LTS of process P0 = (S; A; Æ; s0) by an action a 2 (P)
if and only if (s; a; s0) 2 Æ. We write this (S; A; Æ; s) a!
(S; A; Æ; s0).
Processes can be composed determining new process be-
haviors. We will use a parallel composition operator (k) like
in CSP [7] where the composition of processes P and Q re-
sults in the synchronization of actions they have in common
and interleaving of the others. Rules in Figure 16 give the
operational semantics of the operator.
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1a: P
a
!P0
PkQ a!P0kQ
a 62 (Q)
1b: Q
a
!Q0
PkQ a!PkQ0
a 62 (P)
2a: P
a
!P0;Q a!Q0
PkQ a!P0kQ0
a 2 (P) \ (Q)
Figure 16. Rules for the parallel composition
operator
As the parallel composition operator is commutative and
associative we simplify notation by writing (P k Q) k R as
P k Q k R.
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